Propagation of Economic Inequality through Reciprocity and Reputation
Folk wisdom considers virtue to be its own reward, but virtue can also pay off in cash.
People who act generously often benefit in turn, both from the recipients of their help (direct reciprocity) and by others who witness or learn about their generosity (indirect reciprocity; Dal Bó, 2005; Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014; Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & Milinski, 2007; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . Individuals with a reputation for generosity also enjoy increased social capital, through access to new cooperative relationships such as economic partnerships built on trust (Feinberg et al., 2014; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010) .
The value of direct and indirect reciprocity is not lost on people. Individuals act more generously when they anticipate future encounters with an interlocutor, or when their reputations are at stake (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Dal Bó, 2005; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . In fact, reciprocity and reputation are cornerstones of both evolutionary accounts of prosociality (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Trivers, 1971) and evidence-based policy suggestions for amplifying cooperation on a large scale (Kraft-Todd, Yoeli, Bhanot, & Rand, 2015) . For instance, people are more likely to vote, donate blood, and conserve energy when their actions are observable by others (Funk, 2010; Lacetera & Macis, 2010; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013) .
Although reputation and reciprocity encourage cooperation, here we explore a potential side effect of these social phenomena: they may benefit some individuals more than others. In studies of reciprocity, participants typically start out with an even distribution of wealth (Milinski et al., 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . By contrast, the real world features enormous and rising economic inequality (Piketty & Saez, 2014) . We propose that when initial distributions of wealth are unequal, reciprocity and reputation might exacerbate economic inequality.
How might reciprocity and reputation widen wealth gaps? One possible mechanism is reward-based reinforcement learning, through which people associate actions with rewards (Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, & O'Doherty, 2010) . Consider two "givers," one of whom starts with a $100 endowment and the other of whom starts with a $20 endowment. If each giver shares half of their resources, they exhibit equal levels of generosity, but provide differing levels of reward value, or raw capital, to beneficiaries. When people experience repeated pairings of a stimulus with reward, they are more likely to return to that stimulus (Gläscher et al., 2010; Wood, in press ). Similarly, we suggest that rewards build positive affect toward another person-even when those rewards do not reflect the giver's generosity-and these positive associations can color later choices of people with whom to interact.
Indeed, recent research demonstrates that beneficiaries choose interaction partners based on both generosity and reward value, in a manner well described by reinforcement learning models (Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015) . That is, people choose to interact with social partners who have provided them with rewards in the past, in addition to choosing those who have been generous. Strikingly, people continue to choose rewarding partners even in later tasks that render previous rewards irrelevant (Hackel et al., 2015) . For instance, Hackel and colleagues (2015) asked participants to choose a partner for a puzzle-solving task that featured no further monetary reward. Participants strongly preferred generous givers, but also had a more modest preference for givers who had provided large rewards. People also display this pattern of preferences when asked to rate how much they like each giver (Hackel, Mende-Siedlecki, & Amodio, 2017) .
If these preferences extend to reciprocity, then wealthy people might also receive larger economic returns on equivalent acts of generosity. This preference should emerge even when people have no strategic reason to help the wealthy-for example, when people will not have any further interactions with a wealthy person. Thus, we hypothesized that people would reciprocate more with the wealthy even when doing so offers no economic benefits. This pattern would suggest that people have an intrinsic preference for helping others who have been associated with reward in the past. We tested these predictions using a series of novel economic games designed to model unequal wealth distribution and its effects on social behavior (Fig. 1 ).
Study 1: Wealth-Based Reciprocity Method
Overview. As in previous experimental manipulations of economic inequality (Nishi, Shirado, Rand, & Christakis, 2015) , we endowed an initial wave of "givers" with either a relatively high number of points ("higher-wealth givers"; average = 200) or low number of points ("lower-wealth givers"; average = 60). Points were converted to money at the end of the experiment. Givers played 36 rounds of a modified dictator game task; in each round they chose whether to share 20% or 50% of their endowment with a future participant (Fig. 1b) . Givers always chose between these two proportions. Although no givers were objectively wealthy, the manipulation of endowment size created relative inequality in the laboratory, which can indicate how wealth might affect behavior in the real world. Previous experiments have used similar manipulations to create relative inequality or alter relative social class (Nishi et al., 2015; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010) .
In a second wave of the experiment, a new set of participants ("recipients") were randomly matched with two higher-wealth givers and two lower-wealth givers, and made iterated choices of which giver with whom to interact (Fig. 1c) . Each time they chose a particular giver, we showed them a randomly ordered choice from that giver. That is, they saw the number of points the giver had available on that trial, and the number of points the giver shared.
Recipients actually received the points givers chose to share on each trial. Thus, participants simultaneously learned about each giver's generosity (the average proportion of points they shared) and reward value (average number of points they shared). That is, participants learned about the average amount of money they could win by selecting a giver, above and beyond that giver's generosity. Critically, when holding generosity constant, higher-wealth givers provided more raw value than lower-wealth ones. Recipients next completed a surprise reciprocity task, in which they could share points in return with each giver. In this stage, there was no longer any advantage to interacting with wealthy givers; recipients had an equal number of points available to share with each giver. There was no therefore no strategic reason for recipients to favor wealthy givers.
Participants. Participants were recruited through the Amazon website Mechanical Turk. In Wave 1, 100 participants (50 female, 50 male; mean age = 38.84, range = 20 to 66) completed a "giver" role. In Wave 2, 100 participants (42 female, 58 male; mean age = 35.63, range = 19 to 65) completed a "recipient" role. To ensure participants in the recipient role were meaningfully responding to the learning task (described below), we instantiated an exclusion rule used in prior online studies of reinforcement learning (Gillan, Otto, Phelps, & Daw, 2015) . If participants had average reaction times ±2 standard deviations from the group mean, did not respond on more than 10% of trials, or pressed the same key on more than 90% of trials, we excluded their data from analysis. We selected this rule prior to analysis during piloting (see Supplemental Material), and used it consistently across all studies. Using this rule, data from thirteen participants were excluded from analysis of Wave 2, leaving 87 participants for analysis. The sample size for Wave 2 (our primary focus of analyses) was determined based on a power analysis for the smallest effect we aimed to detect-namely, a correlation between a learning parameter and wealth-based reciprocity. In a pilot study (see Supplementary Materials), this correlation had value r = -.36. Assuming this effect size, 90% power requires a sample size of 76; we ran additional participants in order to maintain sufficient power after necessary participant exclusions. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. All procedures were approved by the Stanford University Research Compliance Office.
Procedure. In Wave 1, participants were informed that they would be able to repeatedly decide how to allocate a pool of points worth money between themselves and a future participant. Participants completed 36 binary allocation decisions on which a pool of points was displayed in the center of the screen, and two potential allocations were listed underneath on each side of the screen. The two options represented 50% and 20% of the point pool, respectively; the side of the screen on which each allocation appeared switched across rounds.
As a manipulation of inequality, givers were randomly assigned to one of two distributions of point pools. In the "higher-wealth" condition (N = 51), point pools followed a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 200 and standard deviation of 15. In the "lower-wealth" condition (N = 49), the point distribution had mean 60 and standard deviation of 15. These means were chosen so that 20% allocations from the "higher-wealth" distribution and 50% allocations from the "lower-wealth" distribution could slightly overlap, making learning more challenging. Givers did not know that there were two possible point distributions, and therefore, we did not expect giver behavior to vary based upon condition (see Figure S1 in Supplemental Material for the distribution of allocations). Givers knew that that a future recipient would see the amounts they share and would receive a monetary bonus accordingly. However, givers did not know that recipients would have an opportunity to reciprocate.
In Wave 2, participants ("recipients") were informed that they were in a recipient role, in which they would benefit from allocations made by prior givers. Recipients first completed a learning task in which they chose to interact with givers from Wave 1; this learning task was modeled after prior work (Hackel et al., 2015) . Each Wave 2 recipient was randomly matched with two higher-wealth and two lower-wealth givers from Wave 1. We did not place any other restrictions on matches. Recipients were explicitly instructed that each giver could share either 20% or 50% of a point pool. They then completed 60 trials of a learning task, in which each pair of givers appeared 10 times (in randomized order); each giver was equally likely to appear on either side of the screen. On each round, recipients saw two potential givers, and chose one with whom to interact by making a button press. Givers were represented by face avatars (created at pickaface.net) in order to help recipients keep track of different givers. The instructions clarified that these avatars were assigned by the experimenters. Additionally, avatars were randomly assigned to different givers across participants, ensuring that any differences between face avatars (e.g., attractiveness) would not impact results.
Recipients had two seconds to make a choice on each round; this time window is consistent with past work (Hackel et al., 2015) , and offers sufficient time for choices given the iterated nature of the task. This window was limited in order to standardize the amount of time that each participant had available to make decisions. If participants did not make a choice within the response window, they saw a red "X" and a notice that they had not responded in time. After each choice, feedback (lasting two seconds) indicated (1) the number of points shared by the chosen giver and (2) the pool of points that had been available to that giver (e.g., "Shared: 100, Out of: 200"). From this information, recipients could infer both the reward that giver provided and the giver's generosity, or the proportion of their endowment that they shared.
After completing the learning task, recipients were informed that they would have the opportunity to allocate points in return to the givers. The instructions explained that the original givers did not know this stage would take place; this stage was, in fact, a surprise for both givers and recipients. Thus, recipients were fully aware of the choice task and instructions presented to givers, including the fact that givers did not know about the surprise reciprocity stage. Recipients made 20 allocation decisions similar to the allocations performed by the givers. For each decision, recipients saw the face avatar of one giver and a point pool available, and indicated how much to share using a sliding bar. Each face was viewed five times, with five different point pools (20, 40, 60, 80 , and 100 points).
Finally, participants were debriefed and paid their base pay plus a bonus proportional to the number of points they accrued. (The average bonus in Wave 2 was 39 cents, based on a 100 to 1 conversion rate between points and cents. This amount is comparable to the compensation for many tasks in the Mechanical Turk marketplace; in our task, recipients received $1 as their base pay, and so the average bonus was 39% of base pay.)
Materials and de-identified data are available at: https://osf.io/r7d5w/. Figure 1 . Schematic of task, in which higher-wealth and lower-wealth givers earned reciprocity and reputation across waves of participants. (a) In Study 1, participants from Wave 1 ("givers") were randomly grouped together into sets containing two "higher-wealth" and two "lowerwealth" givers, and matched to one participant from Wave 2 ("recipients"). Recipients from Wave 2 learned about and reciprocated with givers. (b) Givers made many decisions to share either 50% or 20% from a pool of points worth money; they were randomly assigned a large pool of resources ("higher-wealth") or a small pool ("lower-wealth"). (c) Recipients made repeated choices to interact with one giver out of a pair. Choices were followed by feedback revealing the number of points shared by that giver, indicating the reward acquired by the recipient, as well as the pool of points that had been available to the giver, indicating the giver's generosity. (d) In a surprise reciprocity task, recipients decided how much to share in return with each giver. (e) In Study 2, each recipient from Wave 2 was further matched with a participant in Wave 3 ("investors"). (f) After learning about givers, recipients in Study 2 recommended each giver for a Trust Game by making a one-to five-star rating. (g) The third wave of participants in Study 2 completed a Trust Game, in which they chose one of four givers to trust with an investment. Each investor saw the reputation ratings provided by one recipient from Wave 2.
Results
To analyze recipient behavior in the reciprocity phase, we fit a mixed effects linear regression predicting proportion shared on each trial, as a function of giver wealth (higher-wealth = 1, lower-wealth = -1), giver generosity, and their interaction. This analysis was used given the nested structure of the data (i.e., multiple trials were embedded within participants). Generosity was defined as the proportion of trials on which givers chose the generous allocation, since giver choices were binary. The regressor for generosity was mean-centered within-participants, so that fixed effects coefficients could be interpreted relative to each participant's mean, and z-scored between-participants, to allow common scaling and meaningful comparison between wealth and generosity coefficients across all participants. We allowed the predictors to interact, and included fixed and random effects for all predictors. We report an estimate of R 2 for mixed effects regression that contains two parts: marginal R 2 (R 2 m ), which indicates the variance explained by fixed effects alone, and conditional R 2 (R 2 c ), which indicates the variance explained by fixed and random effects together (Johnson, 2014; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013) . See Supplemental Materials for further details.
Past work predicts that reciprocity would depend on givers' generosity (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000 Table S1 in Supplemental Materials for all coefficients). As a result, givers who began the game relatively "wealthier" also received greater social returns on equal levels of generosity.
Strikingly, this pattern held true even for givers who never chose a generous allocation ( Fig. 2a) : when reciprocating towards self-serving individuals, participants shared an average of 26% of their available resources with higher-wealth givers, but only 19% of resources with lower-wealth givers. In other words, those who started off relatively wealthier gained more money through direct reciprocity, even when their actions did not warrant preferential treatment.
In fact, regression estimates indicated that a lower-wealth giver would need to make 10.80 more generous allocations (out of 36 choices) than a higher-wealth giver to receive equivalent reciprocity (see Supplemental Materials). This effect replicated two pilot studies (N = 46, N = 141), which also ruled out sampling bias as an explanation for these effects (see Supplementary   Materials and Tables S2-S6 ).
This effect also replicated when we altered the task to reduce the salience of rewards. Our initial task made it slightly easier for participants to compute rewards (which they saw explicitly)
than generosity (which they had to infer). Although it would have been quite easy for participants to infer generosity, given that they knew givers could share either 50% or 20% on each round, it remained possible that this feature of the task heightened participants' focus on reward. To rule out this possibility, we collected data from a new set of 100 participants using an inverted design in which generosity was presented explicitly and reward had to be inferred (e.g., Table S7 ).
Study 2: Wealth-Based Reputation Method
Overview. Although higher-wealth, as compared to lower-wealth, givers benefitted more from direct reciprocity in Study 1, the effect of wealth was nonetheless dwarfed by the influence of generous character. However, wealthier individuals might benefit even more unevenly in "social marketplaces," where people select partners on the basis of reputation. When only one person can be chosen to benefit from a cooperative relationship, reputation assumes a winnertake-all structure. This could magnify the impact of social processes on economic inequality. To test this possibility, we extended the economic game from Study 1 to model reputation in a social marketplace (Fig. 1e ).
As in Study 1, higher-wealth or lower-wealth givers made serial decisions to share generously or stingily with recipients. However, instead of directly paying back givers, recipients in Study 2 were asked to recommend each giver for a Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) to be played by a future participant, by assigning each giver a "Yelp-style" rating between one and five stars (Fig. 1F ). Recipients were informed that their recommendations would help a future participant choose whom to trust and could help givers by persuading new participants to invest with them. These recommendations therefore adhere to the usage of gossip for encouraging prosociality and cooperation (Feinberg et al., 2014; Sommerfeld et al., 2007) .
The instructions also made clear that each future participant would have exactly 20 cents available to invest, and thus there would be no strategic advantage to investing in a formerly higher-wealth, versus lower-wealth, giver. Instead, later participants would be best served by investing in trustworthy givers, presumably best reflected in their generosity, or the proportion of their endowment these givers initially shared.
A third generation of participants ("investors") received reputational information from recipients. Each investor was matched with one recipient, and saw that recipient's star ratings of the four givers with whom the recipient had interacted (Fig. 1G) . Investors selected one giver (of the four) with whom to invest, and played a standard Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995) with the giver. In it, they received twenty cents they could invest with one of the four givers. Any amount invested would be tripled and sent to the giver; the giver could then decide whether to pay back a fair amount, yielding a gain to both parties, or an unfair amount, yielding a loss to the investor.
If reputation depends only on proportion shared, then recipients should rate generous givers highly, but not favor wealthy givers. That is, they should judge equally two givers who always chose a generous (or stingy) allocation, even if one was wealthy and one was not. Procedure. The procedure for Wave 1 was identical to that of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to "higher-wealth" condition (N = 51) or a "lower-wealth" condition (N = 50). (See Figure S2 in Supplemental Material for the distribution of allocations.)
Participants
The procedure for Wave 2 was identical to that of Study 1, with the following exception:
instead of completing a reciprocity stage, recipients recommended each giver for a Trust Game.
Recipients received detailed instructions explaining the rules of the Trust Game. Recipients were informed that a future participant would be able to select one of the four givers they had learned about as a partner for the Trust Game, and were asked to recommend each giver using a one-to five-star rating. (One participant did not respond on one rating, and two participants wrote in a "zero" rating one time each, instead of using the one-to five-star scale provided. These three ratings were excluded from analysis, but other ratings from these three participants were maintained.)
In Wave 3, each participant ("investor") was matched with one recipient from Wave 2, and saw the ratings of the four givers with whom the recipient had interacted. (As described above, three recipients from Wave 2 had one unusable rating each; therefore, these three participants
were not carried forward to Wave 3, as it would not have been possible to show four valid ratings from these participants.) After learning the rules of the Trust Game, investors were asked to select one giver with whom to play, and were next asked to indicate an amount to invest. Our aim in Wave 3 was to quantify the cost of any disparities in reputation. We expected investors to choose the highest-rated givers. This stage therefore allowed us to characterize the financial ramifications of wealth-based reputation.
We required investors to invest at least two cents, for two reasons. First, this rule required them to choose carefully when selecting a partner, which they might not have done if they had planned to invest zero cents. Second, we informed participants that they would receive their full bonus only after their partner chose how much to repay, in order to remove any incentive to invest less and receive a bonus sooner. By requiring a minimum investment of two cents, participants could not receive an immediate bonus by investing nothing.
Following Wave 3, we re-contacted givers from Wave 1 who had been selected as Trust
Game partners. We presented the investments made by Wave 3 investors, and allowed the Wave 1 givers to respond. Winnings were paid out to participants from Waves 1 and 3 based on their joint decisions. In cases where the Wave 1 giver did not respond to re-contacting, we paid the Wave 3 investor according to the mean repayment observed in the rest of the sample.
Results
To analyze Trust Game recommendations in Wave 2, we conducted a mixed effects linear regression predicting star ratings on each trial, as a function of giver wealth (higher-wealth = 1, lower-wealth = -1), giver generosity (participant-mean-centered and z-scored), and their interaction, as in Study 1 (see Table S8 for all fixed effect regression coefficients). See
Supplemental Materials for further details.
Recipients again exhibited a bias towards higher-wealth givers, assigning them higher reputation ratings than lower-wealth givers, b = . total variance explained: R 2 m = .59, R 2 c = .69). Thus, higher-wealth givers received a better reputation than lower-wealth givers for the Trust Game, even when both had proven themselves equally generous.
Again, this discrepancy persisted even when restricting our analysis to givers who always or never made a generous allocation (Fig. 2b) . For example, higher-wealth givers who made zero generous allocations received an average rating of 2.27 stars, whereas comparable lower-wealth givers received 1.47 stars. Regression estimates indicated that lower-wealth givers would need to make 9.36 more generous allocations (out of 36 choices) than a higher-wealth giver to receive equal ratings (see Supplemental Materials).
Reputation, in turn, intensified wealthy givers' monetary advantages over poorer ones.
Investors heavily relied on recipients' star ratings when picking trustees, as expected, choosing the highest-rated giver 93% of the time. (This proportion includes cases in which investors chose one of multiple givers who were equally highly rated). As a result, they invested in higher-wealth givers 55 times, and in lower-wealth givers only 27 times, χ 2 (1, N = 82) = 9.56, p = .002, 95%
CI on proportion of investments given to higher-wealth givers = [.57, .77 ]. This meant that 755 cents were invested with higher-wealth givers, compared to 379 cents invested with lowerwealth givers (Fig. 2c) . In other words, the winner-take-all structure of this Trust Game-in which only one giver benefitted from reputation-magnified wealth disparities, translating a reputational advantage of less than a point into a nearly doubled increase in investments for wealthier givers. Target Generosity
Studies 1 and 2: Reward learning model
We next tested the prediction that reinforcement learning provides a basis for asymmetric reciprocity and reputation. We fit recipient interaction choices as they learned about givers to a computational model validated in previous work (Hackel et al., 2015) . This model characterizes learning about givers' reward value and generosity through prediction errors, or deviations from recipients' expectations. For instance, a giver who previously shared 20% of their endowment, but then shares 50% instead, would produce a generosity prediction error, acting more generously than a recipient expected. By contrast, a giver who shares 80 points on one round and 100 points on the next round would produce a reward prediction error, offering a greater reward than expected-even if they shared 50% on both rounds. Our model then specifies the extent to which each recipient weighs generosity and reward value when deciding with whom to interact next, through a weighting parameter (w). Thus, a recipient with a high weighting parameter learns more from the generosity of a giver, whereas a recipient with a low weighting parameter leans more on givers' reward value.
Formally, this model assumes that participants update a reward value Q and generosity estimate G following feedback on each trial t according to:
(2) where α is a free parameter representing a learning rate, δ Rt represents a reward prediction error, and δ Gt represents a generosity prediction error. (We fit one learning rate to reward and generosity based on prior work [Hackel et al., 2015] ; this feature helps reduce the number of free parameters and avoids tradeoffs between learning and choice parameters, thus stabilizing the (4) Reward was defined as the number of points shared. In prior work using this model, givers made continuous allocations, and generosity was defined as the proportion shared. In the present task, givers made binary choices, and so expected generosity (G) was defined as the probability a giver chooses a generous allocation of 50% (Generosity t = 1) over an inequitable allocation of 20% (Generosity t = 0). An expected value based on generosity was therefore defined as: (5) where P is an estimate of the average number of points available, and a giver chooses the generous allocation with probability G and the inequitable allocation with probability (1-G). The estimated average point pool, P, was set to 130, which is the mean of the two true point pool distributions. Generosity was initialized to .50, representing initial uncertainty about whether or not givers would act generously, and initial reward values were initialized to 45.5 points, computed as the mean expectation given a point pool of 130 points and an equal likelihood of givers sharing 50% or 20%.
The model allowed integration of generosity-based values and reward-based values into an overall expected value according to: Finally, participant choices were modeled using a softmax choice function: (7) where β is an exploration parameter controlling stochasticity of choice, and p i,t is the probability of choosing option i (of j options) on trial t.
This model thus had three free parameters: α, w, and β (see Table S9 for parameter fits across studies). Parameters were estimated using maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation to optimize parameters across all choices, using priors of gamma(1.2, scale=5) applied to exploration parameters and beta(1.1, 1.1) applied to learning rates and the weighting parameter (Hackel et al., 2015) . This model thus produced an estimate of reward-based (versus generosity-based) learning for each participant through the weighting parameter w. As an index of wealth-based reciprocity and reputation, we examined relative reciprocity (Study 1) or reputation (Study 2) given to higher-wealth and lower-wealth targets. Specifically, we computed the average point proportion or reputation ratings given to the two higher-wealth givers viewed by each participant, the average given to the two lower-wealth givers viewed by each participant, and the difference between these values. For this difference score, a higher value indicates greater reciprocity or reputation towards higher-wealth (versus lower-wealth) givers, and a lower value indicates the reverse. We examined the correlation between this measure and the model-derived weighting parameter. Fig. 3b ).
Since the w parameter was not normally distributed, we also computed bootstrap confidence intervals as a robustness check, which yielded the same inferences in Study 1 (95% CI = [-.52, -
.12]) and Study 2 (95% CI = [-.57, -.24] ). In other words, recipients who learned primarily from rewards gave preferential reciprocity and reputation to wealthier targets. This finding illuminates the learning process underlying wealth disparities in social marketplaces. 
Discussion
Reciprocity and reputation promote cooperation and contributions to public goods (KraftTodd et al., 2015) , but here we demonstrate that these social processes can asymmetrically benefit the wealthy. Participants reciprocated more with givers who frequently (rather than seldom) shared generous proportions of money, but also reciprocated more with higher-(rather than lower-) wealth givers, who shared larger sums. Although the influence of wealth was smaller than that of generosity, participants' preference for the wealthy produced stark inequalities when only one giver could benefit from reputation. This is a noteworthy side effect of social economic processes, especially given dramatically rising economic inequality (Piketty & Saez, 2014) . Thus, the present work raises the troubling possibility that those most reliant on social resources-due to possessing few material resources of their own-may have a harder time cultivating social capital.
Our work also provides a precise learning process behind these effects. Past research suggests that social intuitions arise from prior experience (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015; Rand et al., 2014) . Here, we describe a trial-by-trial learning model that predicts reciprocity. In particular, we find that wealth-based reciprocity emerges through reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998 )-a well-characterized neurocognitive process in which people repeat rewarded actions (Gläscher et al., 2010; Hackel et al., 2015; Thorndike, 1911) . Following reinforcement learning, people like not only social partners who display generosity but also those who provide large rewards (Hackel et al., 2017) . This tendency might reflect relatively habitual learning (Wood, in press) . Although people might benefit in everyday life by trading favors with the wealthy, participants gained no advantage here by privileging the wealthy, suggesting that this tendency did not rely on strategic calculation. That is, strategic self-interest might lead people to reciprocate with the wealthy when they can benefit from future trades. However, when people cannot benefit from future interactions, self-interest should not lead them to reciprocate based on partners' wealth. For instance, recipients could have earned the most money in Study 1 by sharing nothing. Even under these conditions, we found that people paid a cost to reciprocate with others-suggesting an intrinsic motive to share-especially if those others had been wealthy in the prior task.
This process highlights a previously unexplored source of reciprocity. When people cannot trade favors strategically, past work suggests that people reciprocate based only on others' generous actions (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) , but we found that reward learning also promotes reciprocity. Moreover, theories of other-regarding prosocial preferences hold that in the face of unequal wealth, people should privilege those with less, due to a taste for equity (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) . Here, we demonstrate that reward learning leads people to increase inequity by privileging wealthier individuals. This tendency might be exacerbated when people do not know a giver's wealth, and therefore cannot directly infer a giver's proportional generosity.
Crucially, this work also suggests boundary conditions for the social propagation of inequality, and strategies through which to mitigate these effects. For instance, reward-based reinforcement learning most strongly influences people who directly gain from others, not those who merely observe those gains from a distance. Observers might more impartially assign positive reputations to generous givers, minimizing the effects of wealth.
Moreover, in our studies, individuals who learned more from generosity (versus rewards) demonstrated more equitable reciprocity across lower-wealth and higher-wealth givers. When people are cued to focus on a given form of value, they can "tune" their attention towards relevant features of the environment (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009 ). This suggests that cuing people to focus on others' generosity might "tune" social marketplaces in a manner that mitigates their effect on wealth disparities.
